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The question of determinants of participation of stock market has long 
been a central question to financial economists. Most notably, Hong, Ku-
bik, and Stein (2001) argue that social interactions affects the investment 
decision of potential stock market investors through two popular channels: 
word-of-mouth and pleasure-in-talk about stock market. In this paper, I 
extend Hong et al.’s model of social interactions to incorporate different ef-
fects of these two channels on stock market participation, conditioning on 
current market situation. The idea is intuitive: When potential investors ob-
serve current bull (bear) market, word-of-mouth and pleasure-in-talk effect 
would work positively (negatively) toward stock market participation due to 
increased number of peers who benefitted (lost their wealth) from bull (bear) 
market situation. In Markov chain process framework, I model stock market 
participation depending on current market situation and discuss empirical 
implications of my model.
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INTRODUCTION
Why people decide to join the stock market? This question has 
long been investigated by financial economists (Mankiw and Zeldes 
1991; Heaton and Lucas 1999; Madrian and Shea 2000; Grinblatt 
and Keloharju 2001; Hong and Stein 2001; Brav et al. 2002; Duflo 
and Saez 2002; Vissing-Jorgensen 2002; Vissing-Jorgensen and 
Attanasio 2003) as well as practitioners. In a rational expectation 
framework, however, asset pricing models fail to explain the stock 
market participation of individuals. A famous equity premium puz-
zle shows that no conventional level of risk averseness could explain 
the revealed market risk premium (Mehra and Prescott 1985), leav-
ing decision of stock market participation a puzzle. In pursue of an-
swer to this question, researchers recently raise the issue of social 
interaction as a determinant of stock market participation (Glaeser 
et al. 1996; Bertrand et al. 2000). In this paper, I especially focus on 
the work of Hong et al. (2001: HKS thereafter), who show how social 
interactions affects the investment decision of potential stock mar-
ket investors in their simple and precise model. They considered two 
channels through which social interaction can affect the decision 
of stock market participation: word-of-mouth (Banerjee 1992; Bikh-
chandani et al. 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg 1995) and pleasure 
in talk about stock market (Becker 1991). Due to these two effects, 
when more of his peers participate in the stock market, individual’s 
entry cost of participating stock market is reduced, thus making so-
cials more likely to join the stock market than non-socials.
In this paper, however, I argue that modeling of stock market par-
ticipation through behavioral effects should reflect current market 
situation, which may affect the impact of these two channels on 
investment decision. It is well-understood that when potential inves-
tors observe current bull market, word-of-mouth and pleasure-in-
talk effect would work positively toward stock market participation 
due to increased number of peers who benefitted from bull market 
situation. If current market is on its bear-situation, then potential 
investors who observe increased number of their peers who lost in 
the stock market may not be inclined to join the stock market that 
much. However, the distinction between the two channels is not 
made and the differential effect of them on stock market participa-
tion based on current market situation is not incorporated in the 
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HKS model. In addition, social interaction was assumed to have ef-
fect through entry cost only. That is, in the HKS model, potential 
stock market investors do not update his belief about future market 
situation after observing the fraction of stock market participants in 
their cohort. Probability of positive market net excess return in one 
period is exogenously given in HKS model. To overcome this issue 
and extend HKS to more realistic setting, I model decision of stock 
market participation incorporating the effect of current market situ-
ation on word-of-mouth and pleasure-in-talk. I also discuss empiri-
cal implications of my model in this paper.
To incorporate potential investors’ belief into the model of invest-
ment decision, I model the stock market participation in a Markov 
process framework in this paper. In distinguishing the word-of-
mouth and pleasure-in-talk effect, modeling by Markov process 
provides various benefits. Most importantly, the Markov process 
framework provides a simple and appropriate way of modeling the 
investment decision conditioning on the current market situation. In-
corporating current market situation is important when only word-
of-mouth effect is considered. In bull markets,1) potential investors 
will observe more of his peers who already earned (i.e., winners) in 
the stock market. This will make socials more likely to join the stock 
market through word-of-mouth effect. But in a bear market situa-
tion, he is more likely to observe more of his peers who already lost 
their money in the stock market, which negatively affects his deci-
sion of stock market participation. Hence, in considering word-of-
mouth effect, it is important to consider current market condition 
before I model the stock market participation. Markov model pro-
vides a good way of modeling such situation.
Another important point is that, in separating word-of-mouth ef-
fect from pleasure- in-talk, the fraction of winners in the cohort is 
more important than fraction of who merely participate in the stock 
market. If we want to consider pleasure-in-talk together, then frac-
tion of participants can be important as in HKS. But by restricting 
the channel to only word-of-mouth, it is reasonable to assume that 
more of observed winners will positively affect participation deci-
sion: For example, if I observe that 90% of stock market participants 
  1) The terms of bull and bear markets are slightly different from their conventional 
meaning. I use the term ‘bull (bear)’ market to denote the stock market situa-
tion where a large number of investors who gained positive (negative) earnings in 
the stock market is observed.
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are losers in my cohort, I will not be inclined to attend stock market 
even though 99% of my cohort are currently engaged in the stock 
market. Note that pleasure-of-talking effect can make me inclined to 
join the stock market in this situation, though. When everybody in 
the cohort is talking about stock market, I will be more inclined to 
join them to get the pleasure-in-talk about stock market. By consid-
ering only word-of-mouth, I exclude this possibility in this paper.
In the analysis, I do not separate socials and non-socials as HKS 
did. It is unreasonable to assume that non-socials will never have 
any kind of social interaction in their life.2) It is more reasonable to 
think that non-socials do have social interaction but only up to a far 
less degree than socials do. Of course, it may be controversial that 
how much is “far less.” But note that that’s why I do not separate 
socials and non-socials here. While releasing unreasonable assump-
tion of separating those two groups of possible investors, I still can 
show that social interaction does affect investment decision by us-
ing the Markov model explained in the next section. I will show that 
how the degree of such effect has influences on potential investors’ 
investment decision.
Benefits of building Markov model and the differences of it from 
HKS are summarized in the below:
•  I focus only on word-of-mouth effect, thus making it possible to 
distinguish the effects of two channels considered in HKS.
•  I assume that potential stock market investors update their sub-
jective expected probability of up- and down-market in one peri-
od through social interaction. Markov process provides a method 
of modeling such situation. That is, we now can investigate the 
endogenous probability of future market net excess return of po-
tential investors.
•  In this updating scheme, I successfully incorporate prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) in the model. By doing 
so, I successfully model the differences in impact of positive and 
negative stock markets on investment decision through loss 
aversion.
  2) HKS assumed this. The key in their explanation of peer effect is from different 
levels of entry cost for socials and non-socials. While the entry cost of socials 
decreases by observing more people who is joining the stock market in the co-
hort, that of non-socials are not affected by social interaction as implied by the 
name of non-socials.
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•  Instead of considering the fraction of who participate in the stock 
market in the cohort, I will consider the fraction of winners in 
the stock market in the potential investor’s cohort.
•  I do not separate socials and non-socials as in HKS. Instead, I 
will show the degree of effect that the social interaction has on 
the investment decision.
•  I show that there exists a threshold level of social interaction 
that induces potential investors to join the stock market. Con-
sistent with the practitioners’ concern, I model that this thresh-
old varies according to current market situation.
•  By loosening the assumption of positive expected future return 
in HKS, I allow the different direction of investment, long vs. 
short, of potential investors. Also, I show the size of investment 
induced by social interaction is larger for long position than 
short position under some restriction.
•  As in HKS, I can still use the framework of reduced entry cost in 
explaining the effect of social interaction on the decision of stock 
market participation. I start by reviewing HKS in the next sec-
tion.
BRIEf REvIEW Of HKS MODEL
HKS is a one-period single asset model in which two possible fu-
ture market excess returns are considered: The probability of de-
creased market return in one period, rd (< 0), is π, thus increased 
market excess return in one period, ru (> 0), has probability of 1 − π. 
The model also assumes positive expected return in one period:
of social interaction on the decision of stock market participation. I start by reviewing 
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model also assumes positive expected return in one period: 
 
By solving maximization problem of power utility holder, equilibrium level of fraction 





Here, m < 1 holds by (1)3), thus making equilibrium level of investment in (2) always 
positive. 
Entry cost of stock market participation is assumed to be ci and ci  B(ps) for non-
socials and socials, respectively. Here, ci is the idiosyncratic participation-cost parameter, 
which is assumed to be distributed according to a cumulative distribution function G(ci) and  
is a common participation-cost parameter. B(·) is an increasing function of fraction of stock 
3)  This assumption plays a crucial role by making equilibrium portion invested in the stock 
market always positive. So, the room for considering short position is removed by this 
assumption in the HKS model. 
 (1)
By solving maximization problem of p wer utility holder, 
equilibrium level of fraction invested in the stock market out of his 
wealth is given by
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Here, m < 1 holds by (1)3), thus making equilibrium level of investment in (2) always 
positive. 
Entry cost of stock market participation is assumed to be ci and ci  B(ps) for non-
socials and socials, respectively. Here, ci is the idiosyncratic participation-cost parameter, 
which is assumed to be distributed according to a cumulative distribution function G(ci) and  
is a common participation-cost parameter. B(·) is an increasing function of fraction of stock 
3)  This assumption plays a crucial role by making equilibrium portion invested in the stock 
market always positive. So, the room for considering short position is removed by this 
assumption in the HKS model. 
Here, m < 1 holds by (1),3) thus making equilibrium level of 
investment in (2) always positive.
Entry cost of stock market participation is assumed to be θci and 
θci − B(ps) for non-socials and socials, respectively. Here, ci is the 
idiosyncratic participation-cost parameter, which is assumed to be 
dist ibuted according to a cumul ve di ribution function G(ci) and 
θ is a common participation-cost parameter. B(·) is an increasing 
function of fraction of stock market participants in the cohort, ps, so 
observing more of his peers who joined stock market will reduce the 
entry cost for socials. Through individual rationality conditions of 
socials and non-socials, HKS shows that the fractions of socials who 
joined stock market, ps, is bigger than that of nonsocial-cohort, pn.
4)
MODELINg By MARKOv PROCESS
I consider a single-period model with single risky asset in the 
economy. I assume zero risk-free rate for simplicity. Excess return 
on the market is assumed5) to be r (r > 0) with unconditional prob-
ability of π and −r with probability of 1 − π. Investors have initial 
wealth of W0 and their terminal wealth is W. I will use power utility 
function of U (W) = W 1−γ / (1 − γ), where γ > 0. h denotes the fraction 
of wealth allocated to the stock market.
Now, I build some different setup with HKS. I assume that poten-
tial investors in sociable groups update their subjective expected 
probability of up- and down-market in one period after observing 
the fraction of winners. Let φW (0 ≤ φW ≤ 1) be the fraction of such 
winners out of the total number of stock-market participants in a 
given investor’s cohort. Since φW uses total number of stock market 
  3) This assumption plays a crucial role by making equilibrium portion invested in 
the stock market always positive. So, the room for considering short position is 
removed by this assumption in the HKS model.
  4) Details about comparing social and nonsocial fractions will be shown in Section 6. 
  5) The assumption of the same absolute value of excess returns in up- and down-
market with different signs is actually a simpler one than in HKS. This reduces 
some tedious calculation while the loss from this assumption is trivial.
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participants as denominator, 1 – φW denote the fraction of losers in 
her cohort.
Rather than assuming positive expected net excess return as in (1) 
of HKS, I will investigate the conditions which will affect the direc-
tion and participation in stock market. It is clear that people will not 
participate in the stock market by taking long position if the uncon-
ditional expected net excess return is negative. So, we have a neces-
sary condition for non-negative investment in his long position, πr − 
(1 − π) r ≥ 0, which gives us:non-negative investment in his long position, r  (1  ) r  0, which gives us: 
 
Let potential investor’s conditional probabilities of future net excess returns given current 





Ut and Dt are the indicators for market condition at time t which denote the up-market and 
down-market, respectively while positive constants U and D respectively denote the 
coe cients for weights of W and 1  W. Note that  as implied by (4) and (6). 
Su cient condition6) for (4) (7) to be valid probabilities is: 
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subjective probability of future net excess return after observing the size of the fraction of 
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her conditional probability with the observed fraction. Note that such weights depend on each 
given state in this model as is obvious by using two di erent U and D. This allows di erent 
6)  Since (4) (7) are probabilities which require non-negativeness and maximum value of one, the 
necessary conditions for the validity of my setting in (4) (7) are: 
. But this generates the problem that our ’s depend on W. Since my analysis is 
based on the given constant , (8) serves as a good restriction. 
 (3)
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. But this generates the problem that our ’s depend on W. Since my analysis is 
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 (7)
Ut and Dt are the indicators for market condition at time t which 
denote the up-market and down-ma ket, respectively w ile positive 
constants αU and αD respectively denote the coefficients for weights 
of φW and 1 − φW. Note that πU, πD ≥ 1/2 as implied by (4) and (6). 
Sufficient condition6) for (4)−(7) to be valid probabilities is:
  6) Since (4)−(7) are probabilities which require non-negativeness and maximum val-
ue of one, the necessary conditions for the validity f my setting in (4)−(7) are: 0 ≤ 
αU ≤ 1/2φW and 0 ≤ αD ≤ 1/{2(1 − φW)}. But this generates the probl m that our α’s 
depend on φW. Since my analysis is based on the given constant α, (8) serves as 
a good restriction.
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This setup of Markov process makes it possible that the potential 
investor update her subjective probability of future net excess return 
after observing the size of the fraction of winners in the group where 
she is joining in. Coefficients α( · ) works as a weight in updating her 
conditional probability with the observed fraction. Note that such 
weights depend on eac  given state in this model as is obvious 
by using two different αU and αD. This allows different updating 
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she will positively update her belief by increasing her conditional probabilities for future up-
markets. The opposite would be applied when she observed more losers. My Markov setup 
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Optimal fraction of investment of her w alth would be h* which 
solves the expected utility maximizing problem of:
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incorporate this into my model, I assume: 
 
Intuitively, we think that when potential investors observe more winners in her groups, 
she will positively update her belief by increasing her conditional probabilities for future up-
markets. The opposite would be applied when she observed more losers. My Markov setup 





Optimal fraction of investment of her wealth would be h  which solves the expected 
utility maximizing problem of: 
 
where, W U  W0 [(1  h) + h (1 + r)] and W D  W0 [(1  h) + h (1  r)]. 
First order necessary condition is also su cient by the risk-averseness of the given utility 




where, W  U ≡ W0 [(1 − h) + h (1 + r )] and W  
D ≡ W0 [(1 − h ) + h (1 − r )].
First order necessary condition i  al o suffici t by the risk-
averseness of the given utility function. Solution, as denoted by un-
c nditional probability of π is as follows:
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incorporate this into my model, I assume: 
 
Intuitively, we think that when potential investors observe more winners in her groups, 
she will positively update her belief by increasing her conditional probabilities for future up-
markets. The opposite would be applied when she observed more losers. My Markov setup 
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utility maximizing problem of: 
 
where, W U  W0 [(1  h) + h (1 + r)] and W D  W0 [(1  h) + h (1  r)]. 
First order necessary condition is also su cient by the risk-averseness of the given utility 






Note that by (3), m < 1 holds when the potential investor join the stock market by taking 
long position. 
In the next subsection, I will check if this solution has the reasonable features that t 
some of our intuitions discussed earlier. 
 
HOW THE fRACTION Of WINNERS OBSERvED IN THE COHORT 
AffECT OPTIMAL INvESTMENT DECISION? 
 
In this section, I will investigate the behavior of stock-market participant when he does 
not condition on current market situation while his expectation of future net excess return of 
market is given by the conditional probabilities of (4) (7). Similar study for conditioning 
case will be made in the subsequent sections. 
By straight calculation with the assumption of steady-state distribution of unconditional 
probability , we can get the expression of unconditional probability of future up-market by 
conditional probabilities of (4) (7). 
 
By (17), m in (16) can also be expressed by conditional probabilities: 
 
Intuition says that the bigger the fraction of winners in the stock market in the cohort is 
observed, the more likely the potential investors actually join the stock market. This intuition 
can easily be checked by investigating the sign of h / W. 
 (16)
Note that by (3), m < 1 holds when the potential investor join the 
stock market by taking long position.
In the next subsection, I will check if this solution has the 
reasonable features that fit some of our intuitions discussed earlier.
HOW THE fRACTION Of WINNERS OBSERvED IN THE CO-
HORT AffECT OPTIMAL INvESTMENT DECISION?
In this section, I will investigate the behavior of stock-market 
participant when he does not condition on current market situation 
while his expectation of future net excess return of market is 
given by the conditional probabilities of (4)−(7). Similar study for 
conditioning case will be made in the subsequent sections.
By straight calculation with the assumption of steady-state 
distribution of unconditional probability π, we can get the expression 
of unconditional probability of future up-market by conditional 
probabilities of (4)−(7).
 
Note that by (3), m < 1 holds when the potential investor join the stock market by taking 
long position. 
In the next subsection, I will check if this solution has the reasonable features that t 
some of our intuitions discussed earlier. 
 
HOW THE fRACTION Of WINNERS OBSERvED IN THE COHORT 
AffECT OPTIMAL INvESTMENT DECISION? 
 
In this section, I will investigate the behavior of stock-market participant when he does 
not condition on current market situation while his expectation of future net excess return of 
market is given by the conditional probabilities of (4) (7). Similar study for conditioning 
case will be made in the subsequent sections. 
By straight calculation with the assumption of steady-state distribution of unconditional 
probability , we can get the expression of unconditional probability of future up-market by 
conditional probabilities of (4) (7). 
 
By (17), m in (16) can also be expressed by conditional probabilities: 
 
Intuition says that the bigger the fraction of winners in the stock market in the cohort is 
observed, the more likely the potential investors actually join the stock market. This intuition 
can easily be checked by investigating the sign of h / W. 
 (17)
By (17), m in (16) can also be expressed by conditional probabilities:
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Note that by (3), m < 1 holds when the potential investor join the stock market by taking 
long position. 
In the next subsection, I will check if this solution has the reasonable features that t 
some of our intuitions discussed earlier. 
 
HOW THE fRACTION Of WINNERS OBSERvED IN THE COHORT 
AffECT OPTIMAL INvESTMENT DECISION? 
 
In this section, I will investigate the behavior of stock-market participant when he does 
not condition on current market situation while his expectation of future net excess return of 
market is given by the conditional probabilities of (4) (7). Similar study for conditioning 
case will be made in the subsequent sections. 
By straight calculation with the assumption of steady-state distribution of unconditional 
probability , we can get the expression of unconditional probability of future up-market by 
conditional probabilities of (4) (7). 
 
By (17), m in (16) can also be expressed by conditional probabilities: 
 
Intuition says that the bigger the fraction of winners in the stock market in the cohort is 
observed, the more likely the potential investors actually join the stock market. This intuition 
can easily be checked by investigating the sign of h / W. 
 (18)
Intuition says that the bigger the fraction of winners in the stock 
market in the cohort is observed, the more likely the potential in-
vestors actual y j the stock market. This intuition can easily be 
checked by investigating the sign of ∂h* / ∂φW.
Proposition 1 If the potential investor observes more of stock-
market winners in the cohort that he is joining, he will be more likely 
to increase his portion of wealth invested in the stock-market. That is,
Proposition 1 If the potential investor observes more of stock-market winners in the cohort 
that he is joining, he will be more likely to increase his portion of wealth invested in the 
stock-market. That is, 
 
holds. 
Proof 1 By (15) and (16), 
 






which is always negative by (8). By combining (21) with (20), we get (19), which 
completes the proof. 
 
Now, I investigate the threshold level of the fraction of winners in the cohort that will 
 (19)
holds.
Proof 1 By (15) and (16),
Proposition 1 If the potential investor observes more of stock-market winners in the cohort 
that he is joining, he will be more likely to increase his portion of wealth invested in the 
stock-market. That is, 
 
holds. 
Proof 1 By (15) and (16), 
 






which is always negative by (8). By combining (21) with (20), we get (19), which 
completes the proof. 
 
Now, I investigate the threshold level of the fraction of winners in the cohort that will 
 (120)
From (18), (5) and (7),
Propositi n 1 If th  potential investor observes more of stock-market winners in the cohort 
that he is joining, he will be more likely to increase his portion of wealth invested in the 
stock-market. That is, 
 
holds. 
Proof 1 By (15) and (16), 
 






which is always negative by (8). By combining (21) with (20), we get (19), which 
completes the proof. 
 
Now, I investigat the hreshold level of t  fraction of winners in the cohort that will 
So,
Proposition 1 If the potential investor observes more of stock-market winners in the cohort 
that he is joining, he will be more likely to increase his portion of wealth invested in the 
stock-market. That is, 
 
holds. 
Proof 1 By (15) and (16), 
 






which is always negative by (8). By combining (21) with (20), we get (19), which 
completes the proof. 
 
Now, I investigate the threshold level of the fraction of winners in the cohort that will 
 (21)
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which is always negative by (8). By combining (21) with (20), we get 
(19), which completes the proof.
Now, I investigate the threshold level of the fraction of winners in 
the cohort that will induce potential investor to invest in the stock 
market when he observes bigger portion of winners in his cohort 
that exceeds such threshold. That is, I will check if there exists φW  * 
such that potential investors will join the stock market if he ob-
serves φW > φW  *.
Proposition 2 There exists φW  * such that h* > 0 if and only if φW > 
φW  *. And that threshold level is
induce potential investor to invest in the stock market when he observes bigger portion of 
winners in his cohort that exceeds such threshold. That is, I will check if there exists W  such 
that potential investors will join the stock market if he observes W > W . 
Proposition 2 There exists W  such that h  > 0 if and only if W > W . And that threshold 
level is 
 
Proof 2 From (15), it is clear that h  > 0 if and only if m < 1 and by (18), m < 1 if and only if 
1  U < 1  D. So, by (5) and (7), m < 1 is equivalent to 1  U  (1  D) = D  W ( D + 
U) < 0. By letting , I complete the proof. 
 
This proposition provides an interesting and intuitively appealing fact. When we say that 
social interaction a ects the decision of potential investors whether he will join the stock 
market or not, it is reasonable to think that he should observe su ciently large ratio of people 
in his cohort who already got successful performances in the stock market. Proposition 2 
gives us the lower bound that such su ciently big ratio should exceed. Note that this 
threshold level consists of U and D, which are the marginal e ects of fraction of successful 
investors in the cohort on updating the beliefs of potential investor. 
If the potential investor is more pessimistic, thus has bigger D, then he should observe 
bigger ratio of successful market participants in his cohort before he decides attending stock 
market. Proposition 2 shows such intuition is correct by producing higher threshold level for 
more pessimistic potential investors. 
It looks counter-intuitive that the potential investor would take short position (i.e., h  < 0) 
 (22)
Proof 2 From (15), it is clear that h* > 0 if and only if m < 1 and by 
(18), m < 1 if and only if 1 − πU < 1 − πD. So, by (5) and (7), m < 1 is 
equivalent to 1 − πU − (1 − πD) = αD − φW (αD + αU) < 0. By letting φW  * ≡ 
αD/(αU + αD), I complete the proof.
This proposition provides an interesting and intuitively appealing 
fact. When we say that social interaction affects the decision of 
potential investors whether he will join the stock market or not, it 
is reasonable to think that he should observe sufficiently large ratio 
of people in his cohort who already got successful performances 
in the stock market. Proposition 2 gives us the lower bound that 
such sufficiently big ratio should exceed. Note that this threshold 
level consists of αU and αD, which are the marginal effects of fraction 
of succe sf l inv stors in the cohort on updating the beliefs of 
potential investor.
If the potential investor is more pessimistic, thus has bigger 
αD, then he should observe bigger ratio of successful market 
participants in his cohort before he decides attending stock market. 
Proposition 2 shows such intuition is correct by producing higher 
threshold level for more pessimistic potential investors.
It looks counter-intuitive that the potential investor would take 
short position (i.e., h* < 0) if he observes smaller fraction of winners 
than threshold given in proposition 2. T  ee this, note that the 
proof of proposition 2 gives us
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if he observes smaller fraction of winners than threshold given in proposition 2. To see this, 
note that the proof of proposition 2 gives us 
 
Equivalent relation of (23) says that the threshold level of (22) in proposition 2 is actually 
the threshold level of investor sentiment to make a potential investor be more optimistic in a 
bull market than he is pessimistic in a bear market ( U > D), which leads to take long 
position. If he observes smaller fraction than the threshold of (22), pessimism in a bear 
market will dominate his optimism in a bull market, thus making pessimism more dominant. 
It is not counter-intuitive that an investor who has a pessimistic view of future market would 
take short position. 
Note that the result in proposition 2 is from the interpretation of conditional probabilities 
in terms of unconditional probability. In later sections, we will see threshold level is lower
given bull current market situation than the threshold level of (22), thus making people more 
likely to join the stock market when the current market is in its bull status. 
 
WHEN THE POTENTIAL INvESTOR’S DECISION Of JOININg 
STOCK MARKET DEPENDS ON CURRENT MARKET SITUATION 
 
Now, I consider the situation where the potential investors consider current market 
situation to decide whether or not he will join the stock market. E ect of social interaction in 
this case also varies depending on current market situation since current market situation 




Equivalent relation of (23) says that the threshold level of (22) in 
proposition 2 is actually the threshold level of investor sentiment to 
make a potential investor be more optimistic in a bull market than 
he is pessimistic in a bear market (πU > πD ), which leads to take long 
position. If he observes smaller fraction than the threshold of (22), 
pessimism in a bear market will do inate his optimism in a bull 
market, thus making pessimism more dominant. It is not counter-
intuitive that an investor who has a pessimis ic view of future 
market would take short position.
Note that the result in proposition 2 is from the interpretation 
of conditional probabilities in terms of unconditional probability. In 
later sections, we will see threshold level is lower given bull current 
market situation than the threshold level of (22), thus making people 
more likely to join the stock market when the current market 
is in its bull status.
WHEN THE POTENTIAL INvESTOR’S DECISION Of JOININg 
STOCK MARKET DEPENDS ON CURRENT MARKET 
SITUATION
Now, I consider the situation where the potential investors 
consider current market situation to decide whether or not he will 
join the stock market. Effect of social interaction in this case also 
varies depending on current market situation since current market 
situation affects the threshold level of successful stock market 
participants in the cohort as in proposition 2.
When the current market is in a bull-market status
It is reasonable to assume that more people will be induced to 
join the stock market whe  current arket is in bull-market status 
since he may observe more people in the cohort who already been 
successful in the stock market. In this case, his updating of belief 
is made through the conditional probabilities given in (4) and (5). 
Solving his problem of maximizing expected utility as (14) in the 
previous section gives us
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When the current market is in a bull-market status 
 
It is reasonable to assume that more people will be induced to join the stock market when 
current market is in bull-market status since he may observe more people in the cohort who 
already been successful in the stock market. In this case, his updating of belief is made 
through the conditional probabilities given in (4) and (5). Solving his problem of maximizing 




As in the previous section, I can easily derive similar result in this case. 
Proposition 3 When the current market is in bull status, if the potential investor observes 
more of stock-market winners in the cohort that he is joining, he will be more likely to 




Proof 3 By (24) and (25), 
 
From (25), (4) and (5), 
 (24)
where,
When the current market is in a bull-market status 
 
It is reasonable to assume that more people will be induced to join the stock market when 
current market is in bull-market status since he may observe more people in the cohort who 
already been successful in the stock market. In this case, his updating of belief is made 
through the conditional probabilities given in (4) and (5). Solving his problem of maximizing 




As in the previous section, I can easily derive similar result in this case. 
Proposition 3 When the current market is in bull status, if the potential investor observes 
more of stock-market winners in the cohort that he is joining, he will be more likely to 




Proof 3 By (24) and (25), 
 
From (25), (4) and (5), 
 (25)
As in the previous section, I can easily derive similar result in this 
case.
Proposition 3 When the current market is in bull status, if the 
potential investor observes more of stock-market winners in the co-
hort that he is joining, he will be more likely to increase his portion of 
wealth invested in the stock-market. That is,
When the current market is in a bull-market status 
 
It is reasonable to assume that more people will be induced to join the stock market when 
current market is in bull-market status since he may observe more people in the cohort who 
already been successful in the stock market. In this case, his updating of belief is made 
through the conditional probabilities given in (4) and (5). Solving his problem of maximizing 




As in the previous section, I can easily derive similar result in this case. 
Proposition 3 When the current market is in bull status, if the potential investor observes 
more of stock-market winners in the cohort that he is joining, he will be more likely to 




Proof 3 By (24) and (25), 
 
From (25), (4) and (5), 
 (26)
holds.
Proof 3 By (24) and (25),
When the current market is in a bull-market status 
 
It is reasonable to assume that more people will be induced to join the stock market when 
current market is in bull-market status since he may observe more people in the cohort who 
already been successful in the stock market. In this case, his updating of belief is made 
through the conditional probabilities given in (4) and (5). Solving his problem of maximizing 




As in the previous section, I can easily derive similar result in this case. 
Proposition 3 When the current market is in bull status, if the potential investor observes 
more of stock-market winners in the cohort that he is joining, he will be more likely to 




Proof 3 By (24) and (25), 
 
From (25), (4) and (5), 
 (27)
From (25), (4) and (5),
 
By combining (27) and (28), we get (26), which completes the proof. 
 
Now, I investigate the threshold level of the fraction of winners in the cohort. Intuition 
says that when conditioning on current bull market situation, the potential investor will be 
more likely to attend the stock market since he can observe that more people in his cohort 
earned positive gain in the stock market. Thus, I expect the threshold level will be reduced 
when the current market is in bull status. 
Proposition 4 When conditioning on current bull market situation, threshold level of wealth 
which induces potential investor to be involved in stock market will be less than that of (22) 
for unconditioning case. Threshold level  such that hU  > 0 if and only if  is 
zero in this case. 
Proof 4 From (24), it is clear that hU  > 0 holds if and only if mU < 1 and by (25), mU < 1 if 
and only if 1  U < U. This is equivalent to , which gives us  
 
Reduced threshold level in this case is intuitively appealing.7) When the current market is 
in a bull status, potential investors can observe more people in the cohort who already earned 
positive gains in the stock market. In addition, relatively wide spread optimism about the 
7)  The zero threshold value may not seem to bear much of economic intuition but is obtained 
because potential investors’ expectation of future returns is modeled as a linear function of 
fraction of winners in equations (4) to (7). The key implication of the proposition is the fact that 
the threshold is reduced when the current bull market status is considered compared to the case 
when it is not. 
 (28)
By combining (27) and (28), we get (26), which completes the proof.
Now, I investigate the threshold level of the fraction of winners in 
the cohort. Intuition says that when conditioning on current bull 
market situation, the potential investor will be more likely to attend 
the stock market since he can observe that more people in his 
cohort earned positive gain in the stock market. Thus, I expect the 
threshold l vel will be reduced when the current market is in bull 
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status.
Proposition 4 When conditioning on current bull market 
situation, threshold level of wealth which induces potential investor 
to be involved in stock market will be less than that of (22) for 
unconditioning case. Threshold level φU
W  * such that hU * > 0 if and only 
if φW > φU
W  * is zero in this case.
Proof 4 From (24), it is clear that hU * > 0 holds if and only if mU < 1 
and by (25), mU < 1 if and only if 1 − πU < πU. This is equivalent to πU > 
1/2, which gives us φU
W  * = 0
Reduced threshold level in this case is intuitively appealing.7) 
When the current market is in a bull status, potential investors can 
observe more people in the cohort who already earned positive gains 
in the stock market. In addition, relatively wide spread optimism 
about the stock market makes him more comfortable about 
investment in stock market.
When the current market is in a bear-market status
When the current market is in bear status, it is more likely that 
the potential investors observe more people who lost their money 
by investing in the stock market. This has a negative impact in his 
decision of stock market participation. The following propositions 
show that potential investors will join by shorting in the stock 
market rather than taking long position when the current market 
is in bear status. Relevant probabilities in this case will be (6) and 
(7). I get the following equilibrium level of investment by solving the 
problem of maximizing expected utility.
stock market makes him more comfortable about investment in stock market. 
 
When the current market is in a bear-market status 
 
When the current market is in bear status, it is more likely that the potential investors 
observe more people who lost their money by investing in the stock market. This has a 
negative impact in his decision of stock market participa i n. The following prop sitions 
show that potential investors will join by shorting in the stock market rather than taking long 
position when the current market is in bear status. Relevant probabilities in this case will be 
(6) and (7). I get the following equilibrium level of investment by solving the problem of 






since mD  1 which is the result of  from (6). This implies that when the current 
market is in bear status, the potential investors will take short position or will not involve in 
the stock market. The following proposition shows that by observing more fractions who 
failed in the stock market, the amount of short position is reduced while observing bigger 
fraction for successful participants in the cohort increases his short position. 
Proposition 5 When the current market is in bear status, if the potential investor observes 
 (29)
where,
  7) The zero threshold value may not seem to bear much of economic intuition but is 
obtained because potential investors’ expectation of future returns is modeled as 
a linear function of fraction of winners in equations (4) to (7). The key implication 
of the proposition is the fact that the threshold is reduced when the current bull 
market status is considered compared to the case when it is not.
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stock market makes him more comfortable about investment in stock market. 
 
When the current market is in a bear-market status 
 
When the current market is in bear status, it is more likely that the potential investors 
observe more people who lost their money by investing in the stock market. This has a 
negative impact in his decision of stock market participation. The following propositions 
show that potential investors will join by shorting in the stock market rather than taking long 
position when the current market is in bear status. Relevant probabilities in this case will be 
(6) and (7). I get the following equilibrium level of investment by solving the problem of 






since mD  1 which is the result of  from (6). This implies that when the current 
market is in bear status, the potential investors will take short position or will not involve in 
the stock market. The following proposition shows that by observing more fractions who 
failed in the stock market, the amount of short position is reduced while observing bigger 
fraction for successful participants in the cohort increases his short position. 
Proposition 5 When the current market is in bear status, if the potential investor observes 
 (30)
Note that
hD * ≤ 0
since mD ≤ 1 which is the result of πD ≥ 1/2 from (6). This implies 
that when the current market is in bear status, the potential 
investors will take short position or will not involve in the stock 
market. The following proposition shows that by observing more 
fractions who failed in the stock market, the amount of short 
position is reduced while observing bigger fraction for successful 
participants in the cohort increases his short position.
Pr p sition 5 When the current market is in bear status, if the 
potential investor observes more of stock-market winners in the co-
hort that he is joining, he will be more likely to increase his portion 
of wealth shorted in the stock-market. If he observes more of stock-
market losers, then he will reduce the amount of short position. 
That is,
more of stock-market winners in the cohort that he is joining, he will be more likely to 
increase his portion of wealth shorted in the stock-market. If  observes more of stock-




Proof 5 By (29) and (30), 
 
From (30), (6) and (7), 
 
By combining (32) and (33), we get (31), which completes the proof. 
 
E ect of social interaction on the size of the position 
 
In the previous section, I investigated the e ect of social interaction on direction of the 
position that potential investors will take. Now, we observe the size of the position when 
potential investor’s decision of joining stock market depends on current market situation. 
Taking short position is thought as more risky than taking long position. It is from the 
limit of possible loss of investment: The potential maximum loss by taking long position is 
limited by the amount that he paid to buy the stocks, but in short position, theoretically, the 
possible loss is innite. Thus, intuition says that the absolute amount of long position that the 
 
more of stock-market winners in t e co ort that he is joining, he will be more likely to 
increase his portion of wealth shorted in the stock-market. If he observes mor  of stock-
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From (30), (6) and (7), 
 
By combining (32) and (33), we get (31), which completes the proof. 
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In the previous section, I investigated the e ect of social interaction on direction of the 
position that potential investors will take. Now, we observe the size of the position when 
potential investor’s decision of joining stock market depends on current market situation. 
Taking short position is thought as more risky than taking long position. It is from the 
limit of possible loss of investment: The potential maximum loss by taking long position is 
limited by the amount that he paid to buy the stocks, but in short position, theoretically, the 
possible loss is innite. Thus, intuition says that the absolute amount of long position that the 
 (31)
holds.
Proof 5 By (29) and (30),
more of stock-market winners in the cohort that he is joining, he will be more likely to 
increase his portion of wealth shorted in the stock-market. If he observes more of stock-




Proof 5 By (29) and (30), 
 
From (30), (6) and (7), 
 
By combining (32) and (33), we get (31), which completes the proof. 
 
E ect of social interaction on the size of the position 
 
In the previous section, I investigated the e ect of social interaction on direction of the 
position that potential investors will take. Now, we observe the size of the position when 
potential investor’s decision of joining stock market depends on current market situation. 
Taking short position is thought as more risky than taking long position. It is from the 
limit of possible loss of investment: The potential maximum loss by taking long position is 
limited by the amount that he paid to buy the stocks, but in short position, theoretically, the 
possible loss is innite. Thus, intuition says that the absolute amount of long position that the 
 (32)
From (30), (6) and (7),
more of stock-market winners in the coho t that he is joining, he will be more likely to 
increase his portion of wealth shorted in the stock- arket. If he observes more of stock-




Proof 5 By (29) and (30), 
 
From (30), (6) and (7), 
 
By combining (32) and (33), we get (31), which completes the proof. 
 
E ect of social interaction on the size of the position 
 
In the previous section, I investigated the e ect of social interaction on direction of the 
position that potential investors will take. Now, we observe the size of the position when 
potential investor’s decision of joining stock market depends on current market situation. 
Taking short position is thought as more risky than taking long position. It is from the 
limit of possible loss of investment: The potential maximum loss by taking long position is 
limited by the amount that he paid to buy the stocks, but in short position, theoretically, the 
possible loss is innite. Thus, intuition says that the absolute amount of long position that the 
 (33)
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By combining (32) and (33), we get (31), which completes the proof.
Effect of social interaction on the size of the position
In the previous section, I investigated the effect of social 
interaction on direction of the position that potential investors 
will take. Now, we observe the size of the position when potential 
investor’s decision of joining stock market depends on current 
market situation.
Taking short position is thought as more risky than taking 
long position. It is from the limit of possible loss of investment: 
The potential maximum loss by taking long position is limited by 
the amount that he paid to buy the stocks, but in short position, 
theoretically, the possible loss is infinite. Thus, intuition says that 
the absolute amount of long position that the potential investor 
takes when the current market is in a bull status will be larger than 
the amount of short position that he would take when the current 
market is in bear status. Proposition 6 shows this.
Proposition 6 There exists a threshold level φW ** such that the size 
of investment of long position when the current market situation is 
bull is larger (smaller) than the size of short position taken when the 
current market is bear if φW > (<)φW  **. And that threshold level is
potential investor takes when the current market is in a bull status will be larger than the 
amount of short position that he would take when the current market is in bear status. 
Proposition 6 shows this. 
Proposition 6  There exists a threshold level W  such that the size of investment of long
position when the current market situation is bull is larger (smaller) than the size of short 
position taken when the current market is bear if W > (<) W . And that threshold level is 
 
Proof 6 By (24), (25), (29) and (30), 
 
Thus, with (25), (30), (4) and (6), 
 
 
which completes the proof. 
 
Proposition 6 says that when the potential investors observe bigger portion who earned in 
the stock in his cohort, his amount of taking long position is bigger than his amount of short 
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Proposition 6 says that when the potential investors observe bigger 
portion who earned in the stock in his cohort, his amount of taking 
long position is bigger than his amount of short position when the 
current market situation is not favorable. But when he observes 
less fraction of winners in his cohort when the current market is in 
a bear status, he takes short position more aggressively.8) Prospect 
theory supports this result: Observing smaller fraction of winners 
in his cohort in a bear current market situation makes people more 
pessimistic than observing larger fraction of winners in a current 
bull market situation makes people more optimistic, thus leads to 
more aggressive short position when smaller fraction of winner is 
observed in an unfavorable market situation.
ARE SOCIALS MORE LIKELy TO JOIN THE STOCK MARKET 
THAN NON-SOCIALS?
In the previous sections, we saw the effect of social interaction 
on stock market participation by observing a fraction of his wealth 
invested in the stock market, h. In this section, we will see this peer 
effect through individual rationality. Difference with HKS is that I 
will use updating scheme of beliefs rather than entry cost as in 
HKS.
Recall (15). By plugging (15) back into E [U (W )] in (14), we get the 
value function for the stock market participants:
than observing larger fraction of winners in a current bull ma ket situat on akes people 
more optimistic, thus leads to more aggressive short position when smaller fraction of winner 
is observed in an unfavorable market situation. 
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And m is given in (16).  
From 
 
we get the certainty equivalent of wealth, Wp, for a stock market participants, 
 
As in HKS, let  and ci be common and idiosyncratic participation-cost parameters, 
 (35)
where,
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ore optimistic, thus leads to more aggressive short positio  when smaller raction of winner 
is observed in an unfavorable market situation. 
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And m is given in (16). 
From
  8) Since the model assumes nothing about the performance of investment, the 
reason of observing less fractions of winners in a down market is due to small 
amount of short-selling.
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than observing larger fraction of winners in a current bull market situation makes people 
more optimistic, thus leads to more aggressive short position when smaller fraction of winner 
is observed in an unfavorable market situation. 
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 (37)
As in HKS, let θ and ci be comm n and idiosyncratic participation-
cost parameters, respectively. ci is assumed to be distributed 
according to a cumulative distribution function G(ci ). It is important 
to note that I use θci as the cost for entering stock market for both 
socials and non-socials. This is different from HKS since they use 
different entry cost for different cohorts.
Individual rationality condition says that the potential investors 
participate stock market only if
respectively. ci is assumed to be distributed according to a cumulative distribution function 
G(ci). It is important to note that I use ci as the cost for entering stock market for both 
socials and non-socials. This is di erent from HKS since they use di erent entry cost for 
di erent cohorts. 
Individual rationality condition says that the potential investors participate stock mark t 
only if 
 
So, the fraction of stock market participants in the cohort is given by 
 
Proposition 7 If  > 1, the bigger the fraction of winners in the cohort, the more potential 
investors will join the stock market. That is, 
 
holds when  > 1 where G(·) is from (39). 
Proof 7 Since m  =  / (1  ) from (16), K in (36) can be rewritten as K = 21   (m + 1) , 
which clearly shows that K / m > 0. In the proof of proposition 1, I showed m / W < 0. 
Thus, K / W < 0. If  > 1, , which completes the proof. 
 
Proposition 7 clearly shows that observing more winners in the cohort induces more 
people to participate in the stock market. This also supports the conclusion of HKS: Socials 
are more likely to join the stock market than non-socials. 
 (38)
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holds when  > 1 where G(·) is from (39). 
Proof 7 Since m  =  / (1  ) from (16), K in (36) can be rewritten as K = 21   (m + 1) , 
which clearly shows that K / m > 0. In the proof of proposition 1, I showed m / W < 0. 
Thus, K / W < 0. If  > 1, , which completes the proof. 
 
Proposition 7 clearly shows that observing more winners in the cohort induces more 
people to participate in the stock market. This also supports the conclusion of HKS: Socials 
are more likely to join the stock market than non-socials. 
 (39)
Proposition 7 If γ > 1, the bigger the fraction of winners in the co-
hort, the more potential investors will join the stock market. That is,
respectively. ci is assumed to be distributed according to a cumulative distribution function 
G(ci). It is important to note that I use ci as the cost for entering stock market for both 
socials and non-socials. This is di erent from HKS since they use di erent entry cost for 
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Proposition 7 clearly shows that observing more winners in the cohort induces more 
people to participate in the stock market. This also supports the conclusion of HKS: Socials 
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 (40)
holds when γ > 1 where G(·) is from (39).
Proof 7 Since m−γ = π/(1 − π) from (16), K in (36) can be rewritten 
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as K = 21−γ π (m + 1) γ, which clearly shows that ∂K / ∂m > 0. In the 
proof of proposition 1, I showed ∂m/∂φW < 0. Thus, ∂K/∂φW < 0. If γ > 1, 
∂K1/(1−γ)/∂K = 1/(1 − v)Kγ/(1−γ) < 0, which completes the proof.
Proposition 7 clearly shows that observing more winners in the 
cohort induces more people to participate in the stock market. This 
also supports the conclusion of HKS: Socials are more likely to join 
the stock market than non-socials.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I argue that modeling of stock market participation 
through behavioral effects should reflect current market situation, 
which may affect the impact of these two channels on investment 
decision. I model stock market participation in Markov chain 
process framework incorporating the effect of current market 
situation on word-of-mouth and pleasure-in-talk. I also discuss 
empirical implications of my model in this paper.
My model is based on the assumption of power utility function 
and, hence, is sharing the problems that power utility function 
has. However, my Markov model can be widely applied to other 
investment behavior rather than social interaction by allowing 
various interpretation of φW.9) In my Markov model, I defined φW as a 
fraction of winners in the cohort. We may interpret it as an index of 
market sentiment or as current market situation itself.
Even non-socials may have updating belief scheme. By allowing 
other interpretation of φW, we can model this non-social’s behavior, 
too: Instead of having some social interactions, non-socials will 
get much of the information about current market situation 
from TV, internet or any other sources. In this case, for example, 
interpretation of φW as a current stock market index helps model 
non-social’s updating scheme.
Interesting interpretation of φW will be related to the number of 
analysts on a given stock.10) This also gives us an opportunity of 
related empirical study. Updating of this paper will be made exactly 
  9) I thank Bing Han for pointing this out.
10) Some modification will be necessary for this since φW should be a ratio which has 
a value between 0 and 1.
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on this point in the recent future.
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